When All the Ducks Line Up by Henwood, Bart E.
 Bart Henwood
Board Chairperson
1 Dec 07
When All the Ducks Line Up
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20080012498 2019-08-30T04:02:18+00:00Z
 Overview
 Investigation Process
 Bottom Line
 Event Description / Damage
 Causal Tree Analysis
 Significant Observations
  Major Recommendations
 Board Membership
 Safety Rep – Provides safety assessment and
advice for board members
 Pilot Rep – functional specialty
 Maintenance Rep – functional specialty
 Human Factors Rep – functional specialty
 Ex-officio – ensures process and final report
adhere to NASA standards
 Advisors
 Quality Rep – functional specialty
 Legal* - handles legal issues
 Export Control*
 Public Affairs* - manages PA issues
All ensure final document is appropriately annotated for
the type of material and is accurate
* Required by NASA standards
 Investigation Process
 Appointed by letter
 Trained in investigation
 75 working days to deliver report to
appointing authority
 Expected to release immediately
information having safety impact
 Investigation Process
 Find Root and Proximate Cause
 Make Recommendations for Root and
Proximate causes
 Investigation Process
 Proximate Cause:  The event(s) that occurred, including
any condition(s) that existed immediately before the
undesired outcome, directly resulted in its occurrence and,
if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the
undesired outcome.  Also known as the direct cause(s).
 Root Causes:  One of multiple factors (events, conditions,
that are organizational factors) that contributed to or
created the proximate cause and subsequent undesired
outcome and, if eliminated or modified, would have
prevented the undesired outcome.  Typically, multiple root
causes contribute to an undesired outcome.
 Investigation Process
 Contributing Factors:  An event or condition that
may have contributed to the occurrence of an
undesired outcome but, if eliminated or modified,
would not by itself have prevented the occurrence.
 Chronology of Events
Aircraft Takeoff – Caution Light (9:55 AM)
Crew Addresses Caution Light (10:00 – 10:30 AM)
Crew Lands at Dallas Love Field (10:50 AM)
5/16
5/17
5/21
5/22
5/18
Damaged Precooler Identified
Precooler Replaced & Checked
FE Troubleshoots Caution Light
Aircraft Flies Round Trip to Baltimore
FE Notes Visual Damage &
 Heat/Odor in Aft CompartmentAircraft Impounded (1:00PM)
Combined Postflight Preflight (8:00 AM)
 Right Pylon Panels Found Buckled
Damage
 Evidence of possible Forward and Aft
Engine mount isolator heat damage
Aft Equipment Bay Heat Damage
Damage
 Fuselage Skin Buckled
Pylon Hot Sensor Wire
Damage
 Pylon Panels debonded, warped,  and seals deteriorated
Damage
 FS 610- Stringers #9 and #10 Right Damaged
Damage
 Precooler
Low Pressure Air
High Pressure 
Pressure Air
Engine Pylon Area
 Right Precooler
HP Exhaust Coupling
Pylon Hot Sensor
Damage
 Coupling and O-ring displaced
Pylon Hot Light Sensor
Wires Broken
Damage
 Bottom Line
 $605K in damage to fuselage structure and pylon panels
 Proximate Causes –
 Precooler coupling installed without retaining ring allowed
400 deg F/40 psi air to damage structure and disable primary
warning system (SPF)
 Wiring to the pylon hot warning system temperature sensor
broke, disabling the system and preventing the primary
aircrew warning of the bleed air leak condition.
 Root Causes – None
 Did not uncover any systemic organizational factors
 Bottom Line
 Significant Intermediate Causes
 The maintenance and inspection technical data (Computerized
Maintenance Program (CMP) task card, Illustrated Parts Catalogue (IPC),
and Aircraft Maintenance Manual) associated with the precooler
installation did not identify, depict, and establish the importance of the
retaining ring to the HPE coupling and its viability.
 The lack of restraint and protection of the pylon hot warning system
temperature sensor wiring allowed the wiring to break under the
conditions of a bleed air leak from a discon­nected precooler HPE
coupling before the warning system could activate.
 Other factors contributed
 Causal Tree Legend
“And” Logic Gate
“Or” Logic Gate
Subtree Designation
When attached below an event or condition indicates that the span of
control to obtain or resolve that data is limited
Event
Root Cause (Bold Border)
Condition
Contributing Factor (Dashed Border)
 Maintenance Documentation
 CMP –Computerized Maintenance Program:
 Series of tasks in checklist form for maintaining the
aircraft.
 Maintained by aircraft manufacturer
 Electronic database – printed out for each assigned
task
 Maintenance Documentation
 Illustrated Part Catalogue
 Diagrams of all subsystems and aircraft
 Created by aircraft manufacturer
 Online reference that can be printed out
 Maintained by aircraft manufacturer
 Maintenance Manual
 Description of subsystems and their function
 Online reference that can be printed out
 Maintained by aircraft manufacturer
 Causal Tree - Top Level
 Aircrew Unaware of pylon leak
Evidence
• Caution Light on Takeoff
• Last functional check
• Precooler replacement closeout 
   after leak check 
Evidence
• Aircrew Testimony
• No discussion on CVR
 Pylon Hot Sensor Wire Breaks
 Pylon Hot Sensor Wire Breaks
Evidence
• Caution Light on Takeoff
• Crew Testimony/CVR
• Sensor functionality verified
Evidence
• Single power source
• Single sensor
• Single wiring 
 No Other Indications of Leak
 No Other Indications of Leak
 No Other Indications of Leak
Evidence
• Multiple warning sensors did not
    activate (200 deg F)
• 3 Fire Bottles did not discharge (185 –
235)
• Insulation material melting point
• Limited to manifold entrance
• Temp 220 deg F
Evidence
• No significant engine parameter differences
reported
• Bleed air manifold pressure reported normal
• FDR had no engine data
 No Other Indications of Leak
Evidence
• CB location nomenclature confusing
• No mention of potential catastrophic cause
• Flight Manual silent on topic
Evidence
• Mishap CB is located in aft compartment
    outside pressurized vessel
• Controls 3 other warning circuits in addition
     to the  Pylon Hot warning
 Precooler HPE Coupling
Disconnects
 HPE Coupling Disconnects
Evidence
• Third flight w/o retaining ring
Evidence
• Discovered upon next pylon inspection
since precooler replacement
 Sufficient Force/Vibration
Evidence
• Initial engine surge on takeoff 
  aligned with “caution” Light
Evidence
• Normal flight envelope (FDR)
 RR Missing on Precooler
π
 RR Missing – Poor Config Control
 RR Missing – Poor Config Control
Evidence
•  Procedure created by precooler developer
• FAA approved the procedure
Evidence:
•Refurbishment vendor does not track
config (sends what he receives- usually
unit is not the one you removed)
• Vendor refurbishment procedure does
not detail a configuration (FAA
approved)
 RR Missing – Poor
Configuration Control
Evidence:
• Contractor does not track unit
configuration in or out of supplier
Evidence:
• Contractor relies on CMP to employ
configuration control
Evidence:
• CMP card for R&R precooler does
     not invoke CC
 DSI Did Not Inspect for RR
π
 DSI Instructed and Inspected
Task Simultaneously
Evidence
•  FAA maintenance foundation built on A&P certification
• Contractor employs same practice
• Fails to account for experience in specific airframe
π
Evidence
•  Trainee signed off card/DSI signed DSI   block
• Training process does not recognize trainee as
qualified on the task until supervisor signs record
 DSI Assumes Serviceable
Precooler
Evidence
•  Maintenance Documentation
• Maintenance crew testimony
 DSI Assumes Serviceable
Precooler
Evidence
•  No previous incidents with RR missing
•DSI testimony that he was not aware of ring
 DSI Assumes Serviceable
Precooler
Evidence:
• O-rings can be installed without
removing female portion of coupling
• Coupling halves join after precooler
and duct in place
 DSI Assumes Serviceable
Precooler
π π
Evidence – Same as before
•  No  Config Control  of  precooler
 DSI Followed Incomplete
Procedure
ππ
 Incomplete Precooler
R&R Procedure
Evidence:
• Coupling depictions are totally
different from actual
•Some technicians claim they knew of
RR
Evidence:
• Incorrect depictions of coupling
• No step to check for RR in CMP
procedure
• No discussion of RR in IPC
 Trainee Did Not Inspect
 for RR
π π
 Trainee Did Not Inspect
 for RR
Evidence – Same as that for the DSI
•
 No Organizational Factors
 Maintenance Training
 No real identified deficiency since task
documentation was deficient
 Some technicians knew of the Retaining Ring
 All personnel were trained per standards
 Contract SOW was sufficiently clear and complete
 Maintenance COM implemented SOW accurately
 Training process was followed
 No Organizational Factors
 Configuration Control
 No real identified deficiency since documentation was silent
on Retaining Ring
 Contract SOW  was sufficiently clear and complete
 COM shifted responsibility to lead supervisors
 Supervisors relies on CMP as the point of
application—defines when CC is required.
 No requirement in CMP for precooler R&R
 No past mishaps with this factor as a cause
 No Organizational Factors
 Documentation Update
 Some Documentation does have clear inaccuracies
 Lack of knowledge mitigates some failure to update
 Process & policy is clear and reinforced
 Submissions to documentation are occurring by
employees
 No past mishaps with this as a factor as a cause
 Significant Observations
 Contractor Parts Process does not
 Verify FAA certification for a specific part
  Monitor vendor viability (FAA alerts)
  Monitor specific part quality (GIDEP)
 Mishap vendor was
 Not listed as authorized to repair this specific part - admin mistake by
FAA
 Lost certification for a period of time (FAA alert)  for oil precoolers
 Under investigation again
 Significant Observations
 Aircrew local & sim training was incomplete on
Aux Master Warning Circuit Breaker
 Some incidents reviewed had no investigation
documentation, tough to get answers/prevents
trending.
 Major Recommendations
 Correct maintenance technical data and improve
config control to prevent RR absence
 Redesign the Pylon Hot Warning System for the
NASA fleet to improve sensor wiring integrity
 Inspect for RR just prior to installation
 Bar trainees unqualified in task from signing off
work as primary technician
